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Causal selection is the cognitive process throughwhich one ormore elements in a complex
causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we
report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in
causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain
in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend
to judge the later agent to be the actual cause. Second, the impact of temporal location
on causal selection is almost canceled out if the later agent did not violate a norm while
the former did. We argue that this is due to the impact that judgments of norm violation
have on causal selection—even if the violated norm has nothing to do with the obtaining
effect. Third, moral judgments about the effect influence causal selection even in the case
in which agents could not have foreseen the effect and did not intend to bring it about.We
discuss our findings in connection to recent theories of the role of moral judgment in causal
reasoning, on the one hand, and to probabilistic models of temporal location, on the other.
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INTRODUCTION
Mary is filling up her car at a gas station. It was a tough week:
she is extremely tired. Inadvertently, she spills a good amount of
gasoline on the ground, then she walks to the counter. In that
moment, John arrives. He knows that it is prohibited to smoke at a
gas station, but he does not care. As soon as he throws the cigarette
on the ground, the gasoline spilled byMary catches fire, andMary’s
car explodes. Who caused the explosion? When you are asked this
question, you are faced with a problem of causal selection: you
have to single out which element(s) in a complex causal structure
is(are) the actual cause(s) of a certain effect. Who are you going to
choose: Mary, John, both, or neither? You should be careful here.
Something bad happened: a car exploded. Someone could have
been seriously injured, even killed. Thus, the person that you pick
out to be the actual cause is going to face serious trouble.
So, what’s your pick? There are several elements that can guide
your choice. To begin with, there is a temporal difference between
Mary’s and John’s actions: the former took place before the lat-
ter. Moreover, John intentionally dropped the cigarette, while
Mary spilled the gasoline accidentally. Finally, John violated a rule.
Which of these factors, if any, will guide your judgment of actual
causation?Andhowwill these factors interact? If youwant to know
about this (and you ought to, given the tremendous consequences
that a judgment of actual causation might have), you might want
to read this paper. In it, we report on an experiment in which
we investigated how moral and temporal factors influence causal
selection.
Temporal location is the temporal position that an element
occupies in a certain causal structure. In the previous story, for
example,Mary’s spilling gasoline and John’s throwing the cigarette
had different temporal locations, since the former occupied an
earlier temporal position than the latter. Many studies have shown
that temporal location is of crucial importance in causal selec-
tion. However, while some scholars have argued that people tend
to single out the initiating event in a causal structure to be the
actual cause (Vinokur andAjzen, 1982; Johnson et al., 1989), other
researchers have proposed that causal selection processes favor the
last event just before the outcome (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986;
N’gbala and Branscombe, 1995).
Spellman (1997) has tried to reconcile these opposite perspec-
tives by suggesting that the effect of temporal location on causal
selection can be traced back to probability raising: people select
as actual cause the element in a causal structure that raises the
probability of the effect the most. This explains why people iden-
tify the last event to be the actual cause in temporal chains, i.e., in
causal structures in which successive events are causally indepen-
dent of each other1, but identify the initial event to be the actual
cause in unfolding chains, i.e., in causal structures in which later
events causally depend on earlier events (Miller andGunasegaram,
1990)2. Here is an intuitive example of a temporal chain: the fish
1More precisely, we conceive of a temporal chain as follows: a temporal chain from
x1 to effect y consists of a set of causes x1, x2,. . . xn such that (i) x1, x2,. . . xn together
cause y; (ii) x1 is prior to x2, x2 is prior to. . . xn; (iii) x1, x2,. . . xn are not otherwise
causally related; (iv) it is not the case that xn has to be expected on the basis of xn−1.
2Again, a more precise characterization of the notion of an unfolding causal chain
would run like this: an unfolding causal chain from x1 to effect y consists of a set of
causes x1, x2,. . . xn such that (i) x1, x2,. . . xn together cause y; (ii) x1 is prior to x2,
x2 is prior to. . . xn; (iii) each successive cause is caused by all its causal predecessors
(e.g., x2 is caused by x1 and x3 is caused by x1 and x2); (iv) xn has to be expected on
the basis of its causal predecessors.
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owned by a family needs to be fed once a day. If it gets overfed,
it dies. In the morning, the mother feeds it. In the afternoon, the
kids feed it. In the evening, the father feeds it. The fish dies. In
contrast, the domino effect would be an instance of an unfolding
chain: the first toppling tile causes the next to fall, which, in turn,
causes the next to fall, etc.
It has been recently argued, however, that probabilistic models
of the role of temporal location in causal selection fall short of
accounting for causal reasoning about human actions. For exam-
ple, Hilton et al. (2005, 2009) have shown that people tend to favor
human actions over physical events as actual causes, irrespective of
temporal location and change in probability, while McClure et al.
(2007) have established that, when presented with an opportunity
chain, i.e., a causal structure in which an earlier event creates the
opportunity for a second event to occur3, people judge the lat-
ter event to be the actual cause if both events are physical, but
judge both events to be actual causes if both events are human
actions. The following case serves as a paradigmatic example of
an opportunity chain: a man lighting a fire in the forest makes
it possible for a gust of wind to spread smoke across the whole
forest.
These findings suggest that there might be a difference between
the principles guiding causal selection in the case of purely physi-
cal events and those guiding causal selection in the case of human
actions. In particular, while causal reasoning about physical events
could be entirely guided by statistical information, causal reason-
ing about human actions would appear to be sensitive to other
elements as well. Which other elements? Recently, Knobe (2010)
has put forward the intriguing hypothesis that, in the case of
human actions, causal selection is influenced by moral consid-
erations. This brings us to the second main component of our
study.
Consider the so-called Pen Case (Knobe and Fraser, 2008):
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked
with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens,
but faculty members are supposed to buy their own.
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately,
so do the faculty members. The receptionist has repeatedly emailed
them reminders that only administrative assistants are allowed to take
the pens.
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encoun-
ters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take
pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs to take an important
message. . .but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk.
When asked who caused the problem that there were no pens
left, participants answered that Professor Smith caused it to a
significantly higher degree than they answered that the admin-
istrative assistant caused it. Apparently, this pattern of answers
cannot be accounted for in terms of statistical information, given
that Professor Smith’s behavior and the assistant’s have the same
3It is not an easy task to distinguish opportunity causal chains fromunfolding causal
chains. For our purposes, the following partial account of the notion of an unfolding
causal chain will do: an opportunity chain from x1 to effect y consists of a set of
causes x1, x2,. . . xn, z such that (i) x1, x2,. . . xn, and z together cause y; (ii) x1 is
prior to x2, x2 is prior to. . . xn; (iii) y is not be expected on the basis of x1-xn, and y
is to be expected on the basis of z and x1-xn.
typicality degree and raise the probability of the effect to the same
extent. On the other hand, since there is an important moral
difference between what Professor Smith and the administra-
tive assistant did—the former, but not the latter, did something
wrong—, it is plausible to hypothesize that subjects’ causal selec-
tion processes were influenced by moral judgments. But what
exactly was wrong with Professor Smith’s behavior? On the one
hand, it was wrong because it was a norm violation; on the other
hand, it was wrong because it resulted in a bad effect. Thus,
the following question arises: what is the respective contribu-
tion of moral judgments of norm violation and moral judgments
about the goodness/badness of the effect in causal selection? In
recent years, this question has received two main, competing
answers.
The Norm Violation Account (NVA; Hitchcock and Knobe,
2009) maintains that the only moral judgments that impact on
causal selection are moral judgments of norm violation. NVA has
it that causal selection is sensitive to normality: if a subject judges
an element in a causal structure to be abnormal, she will tend to
select it as the actual cause. Violations of moral norms are abnor-
mal events4. Thus, NVA predicts that if a subject judges that a
certain element in a causal structure constitutes a violation of a
moral norm, then she will tend to select it as the actual cause.
Accordingly, NVA explains the Pen Case as follows: subjects sin-
gled out Professor Smith as the actual cause because Professor
Smith’s behavior, but not the administrative assistant’s behavior,
was counternormative.
The culpable control model (CCM; Alicke, 2000) instead pro-
poses that both moral judgments of norm violation and moral
judgments about the effect impact on causal selection, and that
they both do so through a process of blame validation. Suppose
that S performed action A and effect E followed. According to
CCM, two processes are involved in evaluating what S did. On
the one hand, there is a deliberative, rational process that eval-
uates whether S intentionally performed A, whether A caused E,
and whether S foresaw E. On the other hand, there is a sponta-
neous, affective process that evaluates the moral status of S, A,
and E (for example, whether S had malicious intentions, whether
A was a violation of a norm, and whether E was a good or bad
outcome). If these spontaneous moral evaluations are sufficiently
negative to trigger a blame attribution to S, then the elements
evaluated by the deliberative process (i.e., intentionality, causality,
and foreseeability) get processed in a “blame validation mode”:
in order to validate their desire to blame S, people exaggerate the
extent to which S intentionally did A, or the extent to which A
caused E, or the extent to which S foresaw E. Hence, CCM explains
the Pen Case as follows: the fact that Professor Smith violated a
norm and that a bad outcome occurred generated in the subjects
a desire to blame Professor Smith; thus, to validate their desire
4One might wonder whether reducing the impact of morality on causal judgments
to the impact of normality on causal judgments does not in fact reduce the impact of
morality on causal judgments to purely statistical considerations, thus undermining
Knobe’s (2010) idea that causal reasoning about human actions is not sensitive
to statistical information only. The answer is negative, given that, according to
Hitchcock andKnobe (2009), normality in themoral sense is distinct fromnormality
in the statistical sense.
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to blame Professor Smith, subjects heightened Professor Smith’s
causal role.
Both NVA and CCM are interesting accounts of the role of
moral judgment in causal selection. However, given that only
a few experiments on the relation between morality and cau-
sation have been so far conducted, it is not possible yet to
adjudicate which of these accounts, if any, is the right one. In
particular, further experimental investigation is required to disen-
tangle the distinctive contributions to causal selection of moral
judgments of norm violation and moral judgments about the
effect. First, extant experimental scenarios are such that the vio-
lated norm is always intimately connected with the effect that
obtains (Knobe and Fraser, 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009;
Alicke et al., 2011). Accordingly, we currently lack data concern-
ing how moral judgments about the effect and moral judgments
of norm violation contribute to causal selection when norms
and effects are independent of each other. Second, in the great
majority of the experiments so far conducted on the role of
moral judgments about the effect in causal selection, the agent
intended to bring about the effect or was in a position to foresee
that it would occur (a notable exception is Alicke, 1992). Hence,
the currently available evidence does not establish how strongly
causal selection is shaped by moral judgments about the good-
ness or badness of the effect per se and how strongly it is affected
by folk psychological judgments about the foreseeability of the
effect.
The experiment we report in this paper had four main aims.
The first one was to expand on the empirical research on the
role of temporal location in causal selection. In particular, we
were interested in whether subjects, if presented with a temporal
chain in which two human actions differ only in their tempo-
ral location, would judge the later action to be the actual cause,
as it is the case for temporal chains involving purely physical
events (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Miller and Gunasegaram,
1990; N’gbala and Branscombe, 1995), or would consider both
actions to be actual causes, as is the case for opportunity chains
involving human actions (McClure et al., 2007). The second and
third aims of our study concerned the role of morality in causal
selection. On the one hand, we were interested in how moral
judgments about the effect impact on causal selection, indepen-
dently of folk psychological attributions of intentionality and
foreseeability (see Shultz and Wright, 1985 for a related study
on the concept of neglect); on the other hand, we wanted to
assess the roles of moral judgments of norm violation and moral
judgments about the effect in causal selection when norms and
effects are entirely independent of each other. Finally, the fourth
aim was to explore an important but entirely overlooked issue,
i.e., the interplay between morality and temporality in causal
selection.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Two thousand twenty-two participants registered with Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTURK) website were recruited. The sample
consisted of 846 females, 1165 males, and 11 people who did not
identify or did not want to be identified with either gender. The
mean age of our sample was 30.51 (SD = 9.89, age_min = 18).
Individuals who indicated that their mother tongue was not
English or did not fill out the survey completely were excluded.
Participants were also asked about the amount of philosophical
training they had received in the past: None = 396, Some informal
reading = 376, Some undergraduate classes = 732, Completed
BA = 398, Current MA student = 28, Completed MA = 72,
Current PhD student = 10, Completed PhD = 10. A statisti-
cal analysis revealed neither significant differences between the
responses of females andmales, nor significant differences between
the responses of participants who had some philosophical training
and those who did not.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
We started from the following synchronous, neutral effect, no-norm
scenario involving a temporal chain (Scenario 1)5:
Alice and Zoe work for the same company. They work in different
rooms and both of them sometimes need to access the central computer
of the company. Unbeknownst to everybody, if two people are logged in
to the central computer at the same time, an empty email is immediately
sent from the central computer to a non-existent email address.
One day, Alice logs in to the central computer at 9 am. The same day,
Zoe also logs in at 9 am. Immediately, an empty email is sent from the
central computer to a non-existent email address.
We then manipulated this scenario along three dimensions: (A)
temporal location (synchronous, Alice first, Zoe first); (B) moral
status of the effect (neutral, good, bad)6; (C) norm violation (no
norm,Zoe violates a norm), thus obtaining the following 3× 3× 2
experimental design (Table 1):
To illustrate, here are a few scenarios:
Alice first, good effect, no norm (Scenario 5)
Alice and Zoe work for the same company. They work in different
rooms and both of them sometimes need to access the central computer
of the company. Unbeknownst to everybody, if two people are logged in
to the central computer at the same time, some spame-mails containing
dangerous viruses are immediately deleted from the central computer.
One day, Alice logs in to the central computer at 9 am. The same day,
Zoe logs in at 9:30 am, when Alice is already logged in. Immediately,
some spam e-mails containing dangerous viruses are deleted from the
central computer.
Zoe first, bad effect, Zoe violates a norm (Scenario 18)
Alice and Zoe work for the same company. They work in different
rooms and both of them sometimes need to access the central com-
puter of the company. Unbeknownst to everybody, if two people are
logged in to the central computer at the same time, some work e-mails
containing important customer information are immediately deleted
from the central computer.
5We developed these scenarios on the basis of a vignette used by Knobe (2006).
6We verified the moral status of the different outcomes of the scenarios by asking
79 subjects about the status of the outcome when no rule had been violated, and
84 subjects about the status of the outcome when a rule had been violated. Each
subject only received a single question in order to avoid comparative evaluations,
e.g., ‘How would you evaluate the fact that some spam emails containing danger-
ous viruses are deleted from the central computer on a scale from ‘−3’ meaning
‘Very bad’ to ‘3’ meaning ‘Very good’?’ Results are as follows. No rule violation:
neutral outcome = −0.54 (SD = 0.89); good outcome = 2.27 (SD = 1.20); bad out-
come = −2.42 (SD = 0.92). Rule Violation: neutral outcome = −0.56 (SD = 0.99);
good outcome = 2.00 (SD = 1.11); bad outcome = −2.38 (SD = 0.73).
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Table 1 | Labeling structure of the scenarios that were presented to subjects given the 3 × 3 × 2 experimental design.
No norm Norm violation
Synchronous Alice first Zoe first Synchronous Alice first Alice first
Neutral effect 1 2 3 10 11 12
Good effect 4 5 6 13 14 15
Bad effect 7 8 9 16 17 18
In order to make sure that one person is always available to answer
incoming phone calls, the company issued the following official policy:
Alice is the only one permitted to log in to the central computer in the
mornings, whereas Zoe is the only one permitted to log in to the central
computer in the afternoons.
One day, violating the official policy, Zoe logs in to the central com-
puter at 9 am. The same day, following the official policy, Alice logs
in at 9.30 am, when Zoe is already logged in. Immediately, some work
e-mails containing important customer information are deleted from
the central computer.
Each participant received only one of these 18 scenarios andwas
either asked a single forced-choice question about causal attribu-
tion (Q1: 1283 individuals) or two questions in randomized order
regarding the blameworthiness/praiseworthiness of certain acts
described by the scenario (Q2 and Q3: 739 individuals). In order
to make sure that no person had already been acquainted with one
of the scenarios before, participants who answered more than one
vignette were excluded.
Q1. Depending on the scenario the subject was presented with,
s/he answered one of the following questions:
Neutral: Who caused an empty email to be sent from the
central computer to a non-existent email address?
Bad: Who caused some work e-mails containing impor-
tant customer information to be deleted from the central
computer?
Good: Who caused some spam e-mails containing danger-
ous viruses to be removed from the central computer?
(Subjects had to choose one among the following five answers:
(i) Alice, (ii) Zoe, (iii) Both, (iv) None of the two, (v) Not sure).
Q2: How would you evaluate Alice’s logging in to the computer,
on a scale from ‘−3’ to ‘3’ where ‘−3’ means ‘Very blamewor-
thy,’ ‘0’ means ‘Neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy’ and
‘3’ means ‘Very praiseworthy’?
Q3: How would you evaluate Zoe’s logging in to the computer,
on a scale from ‘−3’ to ‘3’ where ‘−3’ means ‘Very blamewor-
thy,’ ‘0’ means ‘Neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy’ and
‘3’ means ‘Very praiseworthy’?
Our methodology departs from most other studies in that sub-
jects are normally requested to say how much a certain element
in a causal chain contributed to a certain effect (e.g., Lagnado
and Channon, 2008; Hilton et al., 2009). We chose not to use
graded questions (e.g., ‘How much did X contribute to E?’), but
rather ungraded who-questions because while the latter are nor-
mally read as asking for a causal report about what happened in
the world, the former are systematically ambiguous, since they can
be interpreted either as asking for a causal report or as asking for
a causal explanation (the distinction between causal reports and
causal explanations is inspired byDavidson (1967), Beebee (2004),
and Varzi (2007). Since our goal was to investigate the impact of
temporal and moral considerations on causal judgments rather
than on causal explanations, we decided to use ungraded who-
questions rather than graded questions7. A second reason to favor
who-questions to questions like ‘How much did X contribute to
E?’ is that we were interested in judgments of actual causation,
but the notion of contribution is not sensitive to the distinction
between actual causes and enabling conditions. In other words, a
sentence like ‘X contributed to E’ can be true even if X is merely an
enabling condition, and not an actual cause, of E. For example, it is
true that gravity (an enabling condition, but not an actual cause)
always contributes to a plane crash (see, e.g., Cheng and Novick,
1991).
RESULTS
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Multinomial logistic regression was applied to integrate the three
independent categorical variables temporal location, moral status
of the effect, and norm violation in a statistical model designed
to identify predictors of causal attribution. All analyses were per-
formed with SPSS Statistics 22. Two models showed a high fit
to the data according to fit indices Pearson χ2, Pseudo R2 (Cox
& Snell) and Likelihood Ratio Test. First, all independent factors
plus an interaction between norm violation and temporal order
yield Pearson (χ2 = 46.441; p = 0.224) and Cox & Snell = 0.490
with all factors highly significant, p < 0.0005. Second, an addi-
tional interaction between norm violation and effect turned out to
be marginally significant p = 0.055, with Pearson (χ2 = 29.978;
p = 0.569) and Cox & Snell = 0.496. No significant interaction
between effect and temporal order was found.
Parameter estimates indicated that subjects were significantly
less likely to select ‘Alice’ rather than‘Both’ as the actual cause when
Alice and Zoe logged in together (B = −1.364; p = 0.013). When
Zoe logged in later, subjects were significantly more likely to select
‘Zoe’ as the actual cause rather than ‘Both’ (B = 0.579; p = 0.034);
7Note that Lagnado and Channon (2008) and Alicke et al. (2011) are insensitive to
the distinction between causal reports and causal explanations and treat, at least
in wording, causal explanation and causal reports on a par. McClure et al. (2007)
and Hilton et al. (2009) explicitly phrase the question in terms of selection of causal
explanations; and McClure et al. suggest that what is tested for is the quality of
an explanation which is, as they put it, “strongly related to [. . .] communicative
relevance,” rather than something like “causal importance” (McClure et al., 2007,
892).
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on the other hand, subjects were significantly less likely to select
‘Zoe’ rather than‘Both’as the actual causewhenZoe did not violate
any norm (B =−5.173; p< 0.001). Finally, subjects were less likely
to select ‘None of the two’ rather than ‘Both’ as the actual cause
when the effect was neutral (B = −2.197, p = 0.003) or good
(B = −1.400; p = 0.025).
CAUSAL SELECTION
Fisher’s Exact Test was used to determine possible significant rela-
tionships between two scenarios in the 3 × 3 × 2 experimental
design, operating with a 3 × 3 × 2 × 5 contingency table. Fisher’s
Exact Test was necessary because some frequencies inside the con-
tingency table were lower than 5. Repeating Fisher’s Exact Test
for various pairwise comparisons made it necessary to adjust the
level of significance. Having limited our analysis to 14 pairwise
comparisons, the level of significance reduced to 0.0036 (using
conservative Bonferroni correction).
Temporal location
The first analysis provided results on how temporal location
impacted on causal selection in a temporal chain when the effect
was held neutral and no norm violation occurred. Three condi-
tions were compared: Scenario 1: both Alice and Zoe log in at the
same time (N = 81); Scenario 2: Alice logs in first (N = 80); Sce-
nario 3: Zoe logs in first (N = 40). As can be seen in Figure 1,
in Scenario 1 81.5% of subjects selected ‘Both’ and 11.1% of
subjects opted for ‘None of the two.’ On the other hand, when
either Alice or Zoe logged in first, the percentage of people who
chose ‘Both’ reduced to 42.5% and 36.4% respectively, with 40.0%
selecting ‘Zoe’ in Scenario 2 and 47.7% selecting ‘Alice’ in Sce-
nario 3. The difference between Scenario 3 and Scenario 1 was
significant (χ2 = 44.847; p < 0.001); however, as expected, there
was no significant difference between Scenario 2 and Scenario 3
when the names Alice and Zoe are interchanged (χ2 = 1.153;
p = 0.920).
Effect
The next analysis assessed how modifying the moral status of
the effect impacted on causal selection when no norm was vio-
lated and the two agents acted simultaneously. As can been seen
in Figure 2, changing the effect from neutral to good (Sce-
nario 1 vs. Scenario 4, N = 69) did not have any impact
on people’s causal selection process: 81.5% vs. 81.2% choos-
ing ‘Both’ and 11.1% vs. 13% choosing ‘None of the two’—no
significant difference between both conditions: (χ2 = 0.832;
p = 0.987). In contrast, changing the outcome from neutral
to bad (Scenario 1 vs. Scenario 7, N = 74) had a significant
effect on people’s responses: the amount of ‘Both’ responses
dropped from 81.5 to 48.6%, whereas the percentage of ‘None
of the two’ responses rose from 11.1 to 43.2%, (χ2 = 22.990;
p < 0.001).
Norm violation
To assess the impact of norm violation on causal selection, Sce-
nario 1 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time; neutral effect;
no norm violation) and Scenario 10 (Alice and Zoe log in at the
same time; neutral effect; Zoe violates a norm) were compared.
As shown by Figure 3, whereas 81.5% selected ‘Both’ to be the
cause in Scenario 1, 74 of 92 participants consider Zoe to be the
sole cause when she violated the company policy (χ2 = 127.198;
p < 0.001).
Effect× temporal location
Scenarios 2, 5, and 8 were compared to investigate how the moral
status of the effect impacted on causal selectionwhen no normwas
violated and the two agents acted one after the other (Figure 4).
Again, no significant difference between the neutral scenario (Sce-
nario 2, N = 80) and the good scenario (Scenario 5, N = 70) was
found, while a negative outcome (Scenario 8, N = 83) increased
the percentage of the ‘None of the two’ answer from 9.9 to 37.3%
(χ2 = 17.746; p = 0.001).
FIGURE 1 | Impact of temporal order on causal judgments. Causal ratings in % for Scenario 1 (Alice and Zoe log in synchronously), Scenario 2 (Alice logs in
first), and Scenario 3 (Zoe logs in first). The effect is held neutral and no rule violation occurs.
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FIGURE 2 | Impact of the moral status of the effect on causal judgments. Causal ratings in % for Scenario 1 (neutral effect), Scenario 4 (good effect), and
Scenario 7 (bad effect). Alice and Zoe both log in synchronously and do not violate a rule.
FIGURE 3 | Impact of norm violation on causal judgments. Comparison of the causal ratings in % for Scenario 1 (no rule violation) and Scenario 10 (Zoe
violates a rule). The effect is held neutral and Alice and Zoe log in synchronously.
FIGURE 4 | Impact of the moral status of the effect on causal judgments in the asynchronous condition. Causal ratings in % for Scenario 2 (neutral
effect), Scenario 5 (good effect) and Scenario 8 (bad effect). No rule violation occurs.
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Norm violation× temporal location
The comparison between Scenario 10 (Alice and Zoe log in at the
same time; neutral effect; Zoe violates a norm) and Scenario 11
(N = 107;Alice logs in first; neutral effect; Zoe violates a norm)did
not yield any significant difference (χ2 = 1.493; p = 0.888), while
the comparison between Scenario 10 and Scenario 12 (N = 102;
Zoe logs in first; neutral effect; Zoe violates a norm) indicated
that ‘Zoe’ responses dropped from 80.4 to 62.7%, ‘Alice’ responses
increased from 3.3 to 14.7%, and ‘Both’ responses increased from
12.0 to 20.6% (see also Figure 5). This latter result (χ2 = 12.337;
p= 0.007)wasmarginally significant after resultswereBonferroni-
corrected.
Effect× norm violation
To assess the impact of moral judgments about the effect on
causal selection when a norm is violated, Scenarios 10 (Alice
and Zoe log in at the same time; neutral effect; Zoe violates
a norm), 13 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time; good
effect; Zoe violates a norm) and 16 (Alice and Zoe log in at
the same time; bad effect; Zoe violates a norm) were compared
(Figure 6). Compared to Scenario 10, the amount of people
who considered Zoe to be the sole cause slightly decreased when
a positive effect was presented and slightly rose for a nega-
tive effect. However, neither of these differences was significant
(χ2 = 3.565, p = 0.500, and χ2 = 5.566, p = 0.202, respec-
tively). The difference between Scenario 13 and Scenario 16 was
marginally significant (χ2 = 12.359; p = 0.004) after Bonferroni
correction.
JUDGMENTS OF BLAME
For computing significant relationships in people’s attributions of
blame in pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni-corrected Analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was used. People rated the blame-/ praisewor-
thiness of Alice and Zoe on a 7-point Likert scale with ‘-3’meaning
‘extremely blameworthy’ and ‘3’meaning ‘extremely praiseworthy’.
Figure 7 demonstrates that the values of blameworthiness of
Alice and Zoe in Scenario 7 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time;
bad effect; no norm violation; 0.19, SD = 0.947; 0.30, SD = 0.954)
did not significantly differ from Scenario 1 (Alice and Zoe log in at
the same time; neutral effect; no norm violation; 0.06, SD = 0.639;
FIGURE 5 | Impact of temporal order on causal judgments in the rule violation condition. Causal ratings in % for Scenario 10 (Alice and Zoe log in
synchronously), Scenario 11 (Alice logs in first), and Scenario 12 (Zoe logs in first). The effect is held neutral.
FIGURE 6 | Impact of the moral status of the effect on causal judgments in asynchronous, rule violation conditions. Causal ratings in % for Scenario 10
(neutral effect), Scenario 13 (good effect) and Scenario 16 (bad effect).
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FIGURE 7 | Impact of the moral status of the effect on blame
judgments. Blame ratings on a 7-point Likert scale with ’-3’ meaning
‘extremely blameworthy’ and ‘3’ meaning ‘extremely praiseworthy’.
Subjects rated the blame-/praiseworthiness of Zoe and Alice in scenarios
without norm violation, with synchronous logging in, and with different
effects.
0.06, SD = 0.639), while subjects rated Alice and Zoe slightly
praiseworthy in Scenario 4 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time;
good effect; no norm violation)8.
In all scenarios in which no norm has been violated, people
largely refrained from attributing praise or blame to either Alice
or Zoe, even if a bad outcome had taken place. In contrast, as
previous studies have already indicated (Hitchcock and Knobe,
2009; Alicke et al., 2011), norm violation seems to be an important
factor for blame and praise attribution. As shown by Figure 8,
not only do people strongly blame Zoe for having violated the
rule (−2.00, SD = 1.075), they also consider Alice’s action to
be in line with the policy of the company and hence high on
praiseworthiness (+1,43, SD = 1.440)9.
DISCUSSION
The first aim of our study was to assess whether and how the tem-
poral location of human actions in a temporal chain influences
8ANOVA: Alice: F(2,138) = 10.393, p < 0.001. Zoe: F(2,138) = 15.564, p < 0.001.
A Post hoc test revealed no significant difference between neutral and bad condition:
Alice: p = 1.000, Zoe: p = 0.611.
9ANOVA: Alice: F(1,91) = 42.378, p < 0.001; Zoe: F(1,91) = 111.999, p < 0.001.
FIGURE 8 | Impact of rule violation on blame judgments. Blame ratings
on a 7-point Likert scale with ’−3’ meaning ‘extremely blameworthy’ and
‘3’ meaning ‘extremely praiseworthy’. Subjects rated the blame-/
praiseworthiness of Zoe and Alice in scenarios with synchronous logging in,
neutral effect, and different normative status.
judgments of actual causation. More precisely, we were interested
in whether judgments of actual causation about two individuals
performing the same kind of action A at the same time would
differ from judgments of actual causation about a temporal chain
in which two individuals perform A one after the other. Proba-
bilistic models of the role of temporal location in causal selection
predicted that subjects will tend to select both agents to be the
actual cause in the synchronous condition, while they will tend to
choose the last agent as actual cause in the asynchronous condi-
tion (Spellman, 1997). Our results support this prediction. To
begin with, multinomial logistic regression revealed that tem-
poral location is a significant predictor of judgments of actual
causation. In particular, parameter estimates showed that, when
two agents perform the same action one after the other, sub-
jects are significantly more likely to select the last agent rather
than both agents as the actual cause. In addition, comparisons
between Scenario 1 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time; neutral
effect, no rule violation) and Scenarios 2 and 3 (Alice and Zoe
log in at different times; neutral effect; no rule violation) indi-
cated that while 81.5% of subjects selected both agents as actual
causes in Scenario 1, only 39.5% of subjects selected both agents
as actual causes in the asynchronous conditions and 43.9% of
subjects selected the last agent as the actual cause (see Figure 1).
Interestingly, our results differ from those obtained by McClure
et al. (2007), who found that, when presented with two asyn-
chronous actions in an opportunity chain, people tend to judge
both actions to be actual causes. Further investigation is needed to
establish why causal reasoning about temporal chains and oppor-
tunity chains differ with respect to the influence of temporal
order.
The second aim of our study was to establish whether moral
judgments about the effect influence causal selection even in the
case in which agents could not have foreseen the effect and did not
intend to bring it about. The NVA predicts that moral judgments
about the effect would not impact on causal selection, given that
this account “makes no mention of any sort of moral judgment
regarding the effect” (Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009). The CCM
insteadpredicts thatmoral judgments about the effectwould influ-
ence actual causation as a function of the blame attributions that
they generate. Importantly, both NVA and CCM fail to accom-
modate our results. Pace NVA, multinomial logistic regression
revealed that the nature of the effect is a significant predictor
of judgments of actual causation. In particular, parameter esti-
mates indicated that judging the effect to be bad predicts the
judgment that no one has caused the effect—in contrast, judg-
ing to effect to be good did not significantly alter judgments of
actual causation with respect to judging the effect to be neutral.
Moreover, as can be seen by the comparison between Scenario
1 (Alice and Zoe log in at the same time; neutral effect, no
norm violation) and Scenario 7 (Alice and Zoe log in at the
same time; bad effect, no norm violation), the influence of judg-
ments about the effect is entirely independent from judgments
of norm violation: in both scenarios no norm violation occurs,
but in Scenario 7, in which a bad effect obtains, the amount of
‘Both’ responses dropped from 81.5 to 48.6%, whereas the per-
centage of ‘None of the two’ responses rose from 11.1 to 43.2%
(see Figure 2).
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However, CCM cannot explain these results either. According
to it, judging an effect to be negative (rather than neutral) will
trigger the desire to blame someone, and causal attributions will
accordingly be automatically enhanced (with respect to a neutral
condition) to “rationalize” this desire. There are two problems
with this proposal. First, subjects considered Alice and Zoe to have
causally contributed to the effect to a significantly lesser extent
when the effect is negative (Scenario 7) thanwhen it is neutral (Sce-
nario 1); second, judgments of blameworthiness were the same in
both scenarios (see Figure 7), hence CCM predicts that subjects’
judgments of actual causation should not be different in these two
conditions.
Accordingly, our results can be summarized as follows: (i)
moral judgments about the effect influence causal selection even
in the case in which the effect was neither foreseen nor intended;
(ii) the influence of moral judgments about the effect on causal
selection cannot be reduced either to the influence of judgments
of norm violation (contra NVA) or to an automatic process of
blame validation (contra CCM); (iii) when an agent S performs
an action A that is followed by an effect E, and S did not fore-
see or intend E, then subjects are significantly less disposed to
judge that S caused E if they judge E to be negative (rather than
neutral or positive). In order to explain (i)-(iii), one might pro-
pose that causal attributions are linked to attributions of moral
responsibility (cf. Sytsma et al., 2012) and hypothesize the exis-
tence of an anti-bad luck condition, according to which, in order
for one to be held responsible for a negative effect E, but not for
a positive or neutral one, one should have intended or foreseen E.
According to this account, when an unintended and unforeseen
positive/neutral effect follows a certain action A performed by a
certain subject S, people are willing to consider A as the cause of
E since they are willing to hold S morally responsible for E; in
contrast, when an unintended and unforeseen negative effect fol-
lows a certain action A performed by a certain subject S, people
are reluctant to consider A as the cause of E, since the anti-bad
luck condition prevents them to judge S to be morally responsi-
ble for E. In our study, however, we did not directly investigate
subjects’ judgments of moral responsibility. Hence, further evi-
dence is needed to assess an explanation of our results along these
lines.
Our third aim was to establish whether judgments of norm
violation influence causal selection even in the case in which the
violated norm has nothing to do with the effect that obtains.
One might expect that this would not be the case. After all, why
should violating a norm N make a person more causally respon-
sible for E if N and E are independent of each other? Things,
however, are entirely different. First, multinomial logistic regres-
sion indicated that norm violation is by far the most significant
predictor of judgments of actual causation: parameter estimates
indicated that Zoe violating a norm hugely increases the likeli-
hood of Zoe being judged to be the sole cause. Second, if a neutral
effect followed the synchronous logging in of Alice and Zoe in
the absence of any norm violation (Scenario 1), 81.5% of sub-
jects answered that both Alice and Zoe caused the effect and only
11.1% answered that Zoe was the only cause. In striking contrast,
when Zoe violated a norm in the neutral synchronous scenario
(Scenario 10), 80.4% judged Zoe to be the sole cause and only
12.0% answered that both Alice and Zoe caused the effect (see
Figure 3).
The role of judgments of norm violation in causal reasoning
can be further appreciated by briefly considering the interplay
between these judgments and judgments about temporal loca-
tion, which has been the fourth aim of our study. Let’s consider
the scenario in which Alice logs in later, Zoe violates a norm, and
a neutral effect follows (Scenario 12). In this case, subjects are
presented with elements that pull in opposite directions: on the
one hand, the fact that Alice logged in later should incline sub-
jects to answer that Alice caused the neutral effect; on the other
hand, the fact that Zoe violated a norm should incline them to
answer that Zoe caused the neutral effect. The cognitive conflict
is solved in a way that shows the important role of norm vio-
lation in causal selection: even though Zoe acted before Alice,
the fact that Zoe violated a norm is sufficient for 62.7% of sub-
ject to answer that she is the sole cause of the neutral effect (see
Figure 5). A similar result emerges when analyzing the interplay
between judgments of norm violation and judgments about the
effect: when a rule was violated, the moral status of the effect had
no significant impact on people’s judgments of causal selection
(see Figure 6).
One might be tempted to consider our results as evidence in
favor of Hitchcock and Knobe’s (2009) NVA, according to which
judgments of norm violations play a pervasive and fundamen-
tal role in guiding causal attributions. Our findings, however, are
not sufficient to conclude that NVA is the right explanation of
the role of judgments of norm violation in causal selection—that
is, they are not sufficient to conclude that judgments of norm
violation influence causal selection qua judgments of norm vio-
lation. In fact, three alternative explanations can be provided.
First, since we found that judgments of norm violation reli-
ably trigger attributions of blame (Figure 8), our results can
be explained by adopting Alicke’s (2000) CCM, according to
which judgments of norm violation influence causal selection
in virtue of triggering blame attributions. Second, if subjects
tend to judge counternormative behaviors as statistically atypi-
cal, it may well be the case that the judgment that Zoe’s behavior
was a norm violation suggested to subjects that Zoe’s behavior
was less statistically typical than Alice’s, and it was this latter
judgment that influenced the subjects’ causal selection processes
(Driver, 2008; but see Knobe and Fraser, 2008 for a rejoinder).
Third, if subjects consider counternormative behaviors to hap-
pen less often than normative ones, subjects might have judged
that Zoe’s behavior covaried with the effect (i.e., they might
have judged that it was the first time that Zoe logged in to
the computer and also the first time that the effect occurred),
and covariation between an event and an effect is known to
have a huge impact on causal judgments (Cheng and Novick,
1992). Further evidence is needed to adjudicate among these
hypotheses.
In conclusion, our study established that temporal location,
the moral status of the effect, and norm violation are all signif-
icant predictors of judgments of actual causation. In line with
probabilistic models of temporal location, we showed that, when
presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents per-
form the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge
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the later agent to be the actual cause. This effect, however, is sig-
nificantly weakened if the second agent did not violate a norm
and the first did, an effect that is predicted by NVA, but can
also be explained by CCM. However, neither of these theories
can account for the role of moral judgments about the effect in
causal reasoning.
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